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THE RIAA AND ONLINE PIRACY:  WHY 
BUNDLING ACCESS TO DIGITAL MUSIC WITH 
OTHER PRODUCTS AND SERVICES WOULD 
GIVE THE INDUSTRY GREATER CONTROL 
OVER DOWNLOADING 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Digital music piracy has become nothing short of a national pastime 
for youths in the United States.  It is estimated that ninety-six percent of 
people between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four have illegally copied 
music in some form and that youths’ MP3 players contain around 800 
illegally copied songs on average.1  Yet, while the digitalization of music 
may seem to be little more than a harbinger of lawsuits, lost profits, and 
policy struggles, music companies’ global revenues from digital music 
sales in 2008 reached a new high of $3.7 billion.2  A legal digital music 
market led by online stores like iTunes and AmazonMP3 has emerged.  
Music downloads are not an inherent evil, nor will they forever harm the 
music industry because of lost CD sales.  Rather, downloads could be 
highly profitable for the music industry, even if the industry was only able 
to collect money from the remaining five percent of legal music 
consumers.3 
In 2003, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), the 
representative of the major United States record labels,4 began attacking 
online music piracy by filing mass lawsuits against individuals who 
allegedly transferred music illegally.5  Five years and 35,000 lawsuits later, 
this approach proved to be inefficient: costs were high, negative publicity 
                                                           
1.  Dan Sabbagh, Average Teenager’s iPod Has 800 Illegal Music Tracks, TIMES 
(LONDON), June 16, 2008, at 13 (referencing Michael Filby, File-Sharers:  Criminals, Civil 
Wrongdoers or the Saviours of the Entertainment Industry?  A Research Study into Behaviour, 
Motivational Rationale & Legal Perception Relating to Cyber Piracy, 5 HERTFORDSHIRE L.J. 2, 
23 (2007), available at http://www.herts.ac.uk/fms/documents/schools/law/HLJ_V5I1_Filby.pdf). 
2.  INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., IFPI DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009 4 
(2009), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2009.pdf  [hereinafter DMR 2009]. 
3.  Id. at 3 (stating that ninety-five percent of all music downloads today are illegal). 
4.  See RIAA:  Who We Are, http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).  
5.  Sarah McBride & Ethan Smith, Music Industry to Abandon Mass Suits, WALL ST. J., 
Dec. 19, 2008, at B1.  
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marred the industry’s image, and it did not sufficiently deter piracy.6  In 
light of this, the RIAA announced in December 2008 that it was ending its 
mass suit approach in favor of agreements in principle with Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs), whereby ISPs will suspend or terminate Internet users’ 
service after repeated RIAA notices of alleged piracy.7 
 While the logistics of this strategy remain to be seen, Part II of this 
Note argues that it will not achieve its desired effect on the digital music 
market and may not even be legal insofar as it unreasonably restricts users’ 
access to legal online content.  Part III argues that the RIAA should shift its 
focus to widespread licensing agreements with ISPs and other retailers 
whereby digital music downloads and streams are either bundled with other 
products and services or sold as separate subscriptions.  This strategy 
would compel ISPs and retailers to compete to acquire licenses and to offer 
consumers the best deals because, as examples in Europe reveal, products 
and services inclusive of access to music are more desirable to consumers.8  
This competition would in turn make licensing more profitable for the 
RIAA and make legal digital music a more appealing and affordable 
alternative to piracy. 
II.  THE RIAA’S FLAWED NEW DEAL 
 A year has now elapsed since the RIAA disclosed its new antipiracy 
strategy and yet there are still no formal ISP collaborations in place.9  
Although major ISPs like Comcast, AT&T, and Verizon now send warning 
notices to alleged infringers, none have bound themselves to restricting 
Internet access after a certain number of warnings.10  Many have even 
publicly refused to do so without a court order,11 and understandably so.  
There are a plethora of reasons why ISPs should not systematically restrict 
users’ Internet service pursuant only to RIAA infringement allegations.  
This Part first sets the stage for an analysis of the RIAA’s new ISP 
collaboration plan by noting how the RIAA detects online music piracy.  It 
then argues that the new plan should be scrapped because RIAA 
infringement allegations are often unfounded, are insufficient grounds for 
                                                           
6.  See id. 
7.  Id. 
8.  See DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 6–10 (noting how ISPs and retailers have profited from 
bundling access to music with their products and services). 
9.  See Greg Sandoval, A Year Out, Where’s RIAA’s Promised ISP Help?, CNET NEWS, 
Dec. 23, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10420803-261.html. 
10.  Id.  
11.  Id.  
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restricting users’ Internet access, and are inefficient means for deterring 
piracy absent a more expansive and affordable legal digital music market. 
A.  Detection of Online Piracy 
 Online music piracy usually occurs on peer-to-peer networks 
(P2Ps),12 which are applications enabling Internet users to search for and 
download songs from other users’ shared music libraries.  Companies such 
as Media Sentry developed software to track this process and are hired by 
the RIAA as private investigators.13  The software searches for songs on a 
P2P network and compares the data “fingerprints” of the files in the results 
list to the fingerprints of copyrighted songs in its database.14  Matches 
indicate that copyrighted songs are being made available for download 
without permission.15 
 Though P2P users’ actual identities are hidden, upon locating a 
copyrighted song being made available for download, the software can 
identify that user’s Internet Protocol (IP) address and, in turn, his or her 
ISP.16  If the RIAA wants to sue that individual for copyright infringement 
insofar as he or she infringed the copyright holder’s exclusive right to 
distribute the work,17 it must ask the ISP to disclose the actual identity of 
the user with that IP address.18  Alternatively, the RIAA can have the ISP 
take down the infringing content as provided under the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act of 1998 (DMCA).19  Under its new plan, the RIAA would 
instead have ISPs forward warning notices to alleged infringers.20  Pursuant 
to contractual RIAA-ISP agreements, ISPs would restrict users’ Internet 
access after approximately three RIAA warnings.21  Agreements would 
                                                           
12.  INT’L FED’N OF THE PHONOGRAPHIC INDUS., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2008 19 
(2008), available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2008.pdf (stating that “P2P file-
sharing still accounts for the large bulk of digital piracy”). 
13.  See Catherine Rampell, How It Does It:  The RIAA Explains How it Catches Alleged 
Music Pirates, CHRONICLE HIGHER EDUC., May 13, 2008, available at 
http://chronicle.com/article/How-It-Does-It-The-RIAA-Ex/786. 
14.  See id.  
15.  See id.  
16.  See id.  
17.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). 
18.  See Rampell, supra note 13.  
19.  U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1998:  U.S. 
COPYRIGHT OFFICE SUMMARY 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.copyright.gov/legislation/dmca.pdf (“Upon receiving proper notification of claimed 
infringement, the provider must expeditiously take down or block access to the material.”). 
20.  See McBride & Smith, supra note 5, at B1. 
21.  Id.  
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likely include some sort of appeals process or ISP review of allegations.22  
 B.  The Inaccuracy of RIAA Infringement Allegations 
One problem with the RIAA’s enforcement methods stems from the 
difference between making music available and actually distributing it.23  
Whereas the software used by RIAA private investigators in recent years 
only detects that copyrighted songs are being made available, i.e. copies of 
a song appeared in a P2P search for the song title, the Copyright Act only 
states that copyright holders have the exclusive right to distribute their 
work.24  The plain-language meanings of “making available” and 
“distributing” indicate that proof of the former does not equate to proof of 
the latter.  Therefore, P2P users are arguably not liable for infringement 
simply by making copyrighted music available for download.  Realistically, 
of course, P2P users almost certainly intend to, and do eventually, 
distribute the music they make available.  Courts have been inconsistent in 
their analysis of the legal distinction between “making available” and 
“actually distributing,” but today require more than just proof of 
copyrighted music being made available.25  Thus, RIAA warning notices 
may not be an adequate legal basis for restricting users’ Internet notice due 
to this evidentiary pitfall in the detection process.  
 It may well only be a matter of time before RIAA private 
investigators develop more sophisticated software that resolves this pitfall, 
but there remain numerous other barriers to accurate, efficient, and legally 
sound RIAA infringement allegations.26  The RIAA is not an impartial 
party, and its detection system must be very expensive.27  IP addresses 
                                                           
22.  See Sandoval, supra note 9. 
23.  See John Eric Seay, “Hang ‘Em High”:  Will the Recording Industry Association of 
America’s New Plan to Posse Up with Internet Service Providers in the Fight Against Online 
Music Piracy Finally Tame the Wild Internet?, 16 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 269, 276 (2009) (noting the 
legal distinction between making music available and actually distributing it).  
24.  17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). 
25.  See Capitol Records Inc. v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1218 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(holding that infringement requires proof of actual distribution because Congress did not include 
“offer to distribute” language in the Copyright Act); Atl. Recording Corp. v. Brennan, 534 F. 
Supp. 2d 278, 281–82 (D. Conn. 2008) (affirming actual distribution standard).  But see Elektra 
Entm’t Group, Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (finding that offers to 
distribute copyrighted music for the purposes of further distribution may be enough to constitute 
infringement).   
26.  See generally Seay, supra note 23, at 276–79. 
27.  See David, Researchers Get MPAA/RIAA to Bust a Printer for P2P File Sharing, 
AUDIOHOLICS ONLINE A/V MAGAZINE, June 16, 2008, 
http://www.audioholics.com/news/industry-news/researchers-mpaa-riaa-printer-p2p-file-sharing. 
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change, and people share computers.  Additionally, copyrighted works can 
be transferred for various fair uses such as for criticism and personal use.28  
In determining whether use of a copyrighted work is infringing or fair, 
courts apply a complex, four-factored, and fact-specific analysis that cannot 
be replicated by software.29  Admittedly, likely few P2P transfers are fair 
uses, but the RIAA’s over-enforcement of antipiracy measures due to 
unawareness of the purpose of such uses is well-documented.30  Even if the 
RIAA’s new plan included an appeals process allowing users to assert a 
fair use defense, copyright holders are not entitled to decide whether 
others’ uses are fair,31 and anything short of judicial adjudication raises 
serious due process questions.32 
C.  Network Neutrality Violations and the FCC 
ISPs might subject themselves to liability by restricting Internet 
access at the RIAA’s behest because, in light of the flaws of the RIAA’s 
detection system, doing so may not constitute “reasonable network 
management” under the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement.33  Though the 
DMCA indemnifies ISPs from liability if they take down allegedly 
infringing content pursuant to an RIAA notice,34 this will likely not protect 
ISPs in the context of restricting Internet access.35  Users should be able to 
access and download any legal websites and applications of their choosing 
without undue interference.36  The FCC, the government agency charged 
with monitoring Internet policies in the United States, preserves this policy 
by prohibiting ISPs from discriminating against certain types of online 
content.37  In 2008, for example, the FCC forced Comcast to end a practice 
                                                           
28.  See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002). 
29.  Id.; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547–67 
(1985) (applying an extensive analysis of the four fair use factors). 
30.  See Michael P. Murtagh, The FCC, the DMCA, and Why Takedown Notices Are Not 
Enough, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 256 (2009). 
31.  See id. at 252.  
32.  See id. at 257.  
33.  In re Matters of Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14986, 14988 (2005) [hereinafter In Re Matters of Appropriate 
Framework]. 
34.  See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 19, at 11. 
35.  See Murtagh, supra note 30, at 271-73 (arguing that RIAA-ISP collaborations fail un-
der the FCC’s Internet Policy Statement).  
36.  See generally In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowl-
edge Against Comcast Corp. for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 F.C.C.R. 
13028 (2008) [hereinafter Matters Against Comcast]. 
37.  See id. 
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of terminating of P2P users’ connections by poisoning packets of data on 
the network.38 
 “Reasonable network management” constitutes an exception to this 
network neutrality principle.39  ISPs can manage the flow of Internet 
content if their policies “clear a high threshold[,] . . . further a critically 
important interest, and [are] narrowly or carefully tailored to serve that 
interest.”40  Comcast’s policy did not distinguish between legal and illegal 
content with sufficient accuracy,41 nor will the RIAA’s new plan because 
users may lose their increasingly important Internet access due to an RIAA 
mistake or fair use.  Thus, while an interest in preventing copyright 
infringement is paramount, the RIAA’s flawed detection measures likely 
preclude ISP restrictions on Internet access from being narrowly tailored to 
achieve that interest.   
D.  Unlikelihood of Deterrence 
Warning letters and threats of restricted Internet access will not deter 
piracy because such efforts further drive user demand for undetectable 
illegal downloading.42  For example, open-source IP filters hinder detection 
of P2P users’ identities and are free and readily available for download 
online.43  The demand for such anti-detection capabilities will likely only 
increase in proportion to the strength and frequency of RIAA detection 
measures and warning letters, because such efforts, at best, only address 
one of two distinct and critical realities in the music industry today.44  The 
appeal of online music piracy likely stems from two common beliefs:  (1) 
buying music is too expensive;45 and (2) illegally downloading it is easy 
                                                           
38.  Id. at 13028, 13031, 13061. 
39.  Id. at 13028; In Re Matters of Appropriate Framework, supra note 33, at 14986, 14988 
n.15. 
40.  Matters Against Comcast, supra note 36. 
41.  Id. 
42.  PhoenixLabs.org, PeerGuardian 2, http://phoenixlabs.org/pg2 (last visited Jan. 4, 
2010); Freewavegenius.com, PeerBlock:  Avoid Detection When Downloading From Torrent Or 
P2P Networks, http://www.freewaregenius.com/2009/11/16/peerblock-avoid-detection-when-
downloading-from-torrent-or-p2p-networks (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). 
43.  See, e.g., PhoenixLabs.org, PeerGuardian 2, http://phoenixlabs.org/pg2 (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2010) (sharing an open-source IP filter).  
44.  See, e.g., Christopher Null, Study:  Digital Music Is Too Expensive, YAHOO! NEWS 
CANADA: THE WORKING GUY, http://ca.tech.yahoo.com/blogs/the_working_guy/rss/article/4287 
(last visited Mar. 5, 2010); Robb Schultz, Illegally Downloading Music:  Opinions From Juanita 
College Students In Pennsylvania, YAHOO! ASSOCIATED CONTENT, June 20, 2009, 
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/1812204/illegally_downloading_music_opinions.html. 
45.  See, e.g., Null, supra note 44. 
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and low-risk.46  While detection measures and warning letters might 
combat the latter problem, it does not address the former.  To that end, the 
RIAA needs to make legal digital music a more flexible, affordable, and 
expansive market; only then will downloading music illegally become less 
appealing than paying for it.  Part III explores one such means for doing so. 
III.  WIDESPREAD LICENSING AS A VIABLE ONLINE MUSIC PIRACY 
SOLUTION 
Part II revealed why RIAA-ISP collaborations under the new plan—
should an ISP ever agree to one—will be unsuccessful and litigious in 
combating online music piracy.  The efficient detection and deterrence of 
illegal music transfers would continually be hampered by, inter alia, cost, 
the fair use doctrine, network neutrality concerns, and anti-detection 
technologies.  This section proposes that deterrence efforts be maintained 
to some degree, but that the RIAA otherwise shift the focus of its anti-
piracy strategy to widespread licensing to ISPs and retailers.  The 
competition between licensees that such a strategy would promote would 
make licensing more profitable for the RIAA and would, in turn, give 
customers a wide array of appealing and affordable alternatives to illegal 
downloading. 
A.  ISP Licenses 
RIAA-ISP licensing agreements could greatly benefit both parties 
involved because they are attractive alternatives to piracy that create 
competitive advantages for the ISP by making its broadband service more 
desirable to consumers.47  An ISP is in a great position to market legal 
digital music downloads to the millions of users already subscribing to its 
broadband service.  Downloads from a catalog of licensed songs can be 
bundled with Internet service, making them easy for the ISP to market and 
easy for consumers to purchase and use.48  RIAA-ISP licenses are also 
promising because users who are satisfied with their Internet service will 
likely regard the ISP as a more trusted and reliable seller of music 
downloads than online stores and websites with which they have not 
previously done business. 
Finally, ISPs can bundle music downloads in a variety of ways, i.e. by 
                                                           
46.  See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 44. 
47.  See generally DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 4 (identifying ISP licensing of music cata-
logs as a positive new trend in the entertainment industry). 
48.  Id. at 8. 
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limited downloads as part of their standard Internet service or unlimited 
downloads for an extra fee, which will promote healthy competition 
between ISPs and online stores.  The ISPs that market the most attractive 
deals will retain more of their current Internet subscriber base, draw new 
subscribers, and tap into digital music stores’ revenue streams.  This 
competitive market would boost demand for music licenses to the RIAA’s 
benefit.  It would also provide consumers with a host of affordable music 
services from which to choose, thereby making piracy less popular.  
 European ISPs began licensing and bundling music downloads in 
recent years and the results have been dramatic.49  In April 2008, Danish 
ISP TDC began offering free, unrestricted access to its catalog of over two 
million songs to its mobile and broadband subscribers.50  Since then, 
monthly subscriptions have soared and the rate at which subscribers have 
left for competitors has plummeted.51  TDC now offers its customers an 
array of other bundled music download services.52  French ISP Neuf 
Cegetel began offering similar music access services in 2007 and has 
reported a marked increase in broadband subscriptions.53  Today, other 
ISPs in France, the United Kingdom (UK), Finland and Sweden also 
license and sell music, with some services being bundled to Internet 
service.54  These examples indicate that the alignment of ISPs and the 
entertainment industry offer limitless business potential.  The United States 
should and very well may be following suit in light of the recent Comcast-
NBC merger.55 
B.  Licensing to Retailers in Related Markets 
 The RIAA should also strive to license music collections to retailers 
in related markets for many of the same reasons.56  The RIAA’s digital 
music catalogs could then be marketed to consumers through sales of 
devices like cell phones, MP3 players, and laptops.  Here again retailers 
could gain a competitive advantage by bundling music services with their 
products and services.  This further strengthens and diversifies the 
                                                           
49.  Id. at 8-9.  
50.  Id. at 9.  
51.  Id. 
52.  See Charles Ferro, Mobile Smorgasbord, BILLBOARD, Nov. 15, 2008, at 19. 
53.  DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 8.  
54.   Id. at 8-9.  
55.  David Goldman & Julianne Pepitone, GE, Comcast Announce Joint NBC Deal, 
CNNMONEY.COM, Dec. 3, 2009, 
http://money.cnn.com/2009/12/03/news/companies/comcast_nbc/index.htm.  
56.  DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 7.  
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competitive market for digital music, giving consumers still more options 
and the RIAA even greater control over revenue streams by being able to 
dictate license pricing with retailers from various industries.  Nokia and 
Sony Ericsson both now sell mobile phones bundled with music 
downloading services in the U.K. and Sweden, respectively.57  
C.  Online Store and Radio Station Licenses 
 The RIAA should continue to license digital music to stores and 
radio stations like iTunes and Pandora, services that are already helping the 
legal music market expand.58  Though the widespread licensing scheme this 
Note advocates would threaten the sustainability of some of them, the 
current digital music market does not offer consumers a sufficiently broad 
range of attractive alternatives to illegal downloading.  Whereas the current 
legal market offers access to music primarily by streaming it on radio 
stations or buying it from stores a la carte, extensive licensing to ISPs and 
other retailers gives consumers a much-improved selection of music 
services, thus diminishing the appeal of piracy. 
D.  Comparative Advantages of a Widespread Licensing Policy 
 Whereas the RIAA currently only profits from roughly five percent 
of music downloads,59 it could obtain much greater control over 
downloading via widespread licensing to ISPs and other retailers.  As 
previously discussed, the market for legal downloads would surge because 
competition between retailers from various industries would provide 
consumers with a host of more affordable and flexible music access 
services.60  The RIAA for its part would likely experience increased 
licensing revenues and increased control over various markets by dictating 
licensing terms. This solution frees both the RIAA and ISPs of the legal 
issues and negative publicity that would surround restrictions of users’ 
Internet access.  It would also make notices of alleged infringement—the 
RIAA can of course still sue for infringement if it so chooses—more of a 
deterrent because users would have various new and affordable alternatives 
to piracy. 
 Some European nations are moving toward either having a 
                                                           
57.  Id. at 8-9.  
58.  See generally id. (noting the positive effect online music stores like iTunes are having 
on the digital music market).  
59.  Id. at 5 (stating that ninety-five percent of music downloads are illegal). 
60.  See supra Part III.A–C. 
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government body monitor online piracy61 or forcing ISPs to take a more 
active role by implementing their own anti-piracy technology.62  These 
alternatives could be improvements to the RIAA’s new plan insofar as 
RIAA infringement allegations would be relied on less when taking action 
against users.  However, many of the same barriers to accurate detection 
would remain—i.e., fair use, network neutrality, and demand for anti-
detection technologies.  Both systems would likely further alienate digital 
music consumers if not Internet subscribers altogether, and both would 
force either taxpayers or ISPs to pay for anti-detection measures when it 
should be the industry that does so.63 
 Others propose collective licensing schemes in which Internet users 
pay a small monthly rate for the right to access music, however they 
choose, without risk of punishment.64  Proceeds are then distributed to 
artists in proportion to “how often their music is downloaded.”65  The 
digital music market has (hopefully) not reached a point of desperation 
where such last resorts are needed, a point where online music piracy is 
decriminalized and artists are essentially paid to forfeit all ownership rights 
to digital versions of their works.  Decriminalizing the illegal downloads 
would also damage or altogether destroy the current legal digital music 
market, i.e. iTunes.66  Finally, if the RIAA and ISPs are so incapable of 
detecting and filtering out illegal music downloads such that they should 
simply resort to decriminalizing piracy, it is unclear how they would 
nonetheless be able to track downloads with enough accuracy to distribute 
proportionate shares of the licensing proceeds to artists.67 
                                                           
61.  Greg Sandoval, France Adopts Three-Strikes Law for Piracy, CNET NEWS, Oct. 22, 
2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001_3-10381365-261.html. 
62.  Andre Yoskowitz, UK Government To Adopt ‘Three Strikes’ Internet Piracy Bill, 
AFTERDAWN.COM, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.afterdawn.com/news/archive/20127.cfm (reporting 
on a new UK bill forcing ISPs to implement a “three strikes and you’re out” policy).  
63.  France:  Second Version of the Three Strikes Law is in Place, EUROPEAN DIGITAL 
RIGHTS, Nov. 4, 2009, http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number7.21/hadopi-2-adopted-final. 
64.  See Seay, supra note 23, at 293. (supporting a voluntary collective licensing scheme). 
65.  Id.  
66.  Although only eight percent of American teens have a moral objection to downloading 
illegal music, decriminalizing illegal music downloads would wipe away this moral objection and 
may encourage more illegal downloads from both people who have and do not have moral objec-
tions.  Marlize van Romburgh, Respect Talent: Don’t Steal Your Entertainment, MUSTANG 
DAILY, May 3, 2009, http://mustangdaily.net/value-the-valuable-don’t-steal-your-entertainment. 
67.  Christian L. Castle & Amy E. Mitchell, What’s Wrong with Music Licensing?, 26 
ENT. & SPORTS LAW 3, 7 (Fall 2008) (“If an ISP can identify the sound recordings on p2p sys-
tems enough to sample [to distribute licensing proceeds to artists], the ISP likely can identify the 
tracks enough to block and filter.”). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
 Illegal music downloading will not be halted by a plan revolving 
around ISP restrictions of Internet access pursuant to repeated RIAA 
infringement allegations.68  The efficient detection and deterrence of illegal 
music transfers would continually be hindered by, among other things, cost, 
the fair use doctrine, network neutrality concerns, and anti-detection 
measures like open-source IP filters.69  The RIAA will not be able to 
smother the illegal digital music market unless and until it couples its 
deterrence efforts with more flexible, affordable, and pervasive access to its 
digital music collections.  Only then will users have attractive alternatives 
to illegal music downloading.70  This expansive legal digital music market 
can best be promulgated by engaging ISPs and retailers in licensing 
agreements whereby music access services are either conveniently bundled 
with other products and services, or offered as a subscription service.71  
Bundling would render those products and services more desirable, thus 
presenting retailers with various possible competitive advantages.72  The 
competition between licensees that this would promote would in turn make 
licensing more profitable for the RIAA and give customers an array of 
appealing and affordable alternatives to illegal downloading.73  This, 
coupled with deterrence efforts such as notices threatening judicial action, 
would finally give the RIAA the upper hand in its war on online piracy.74 
 
Matthew Hofmeister 
                                                           
68.  See supra Part II.D.  
69.  Id. 
70.  Michael Geist, Pollara Changes Its Tune on Music Downloading, MICHAEL GEIST 
BLOG, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/4664/125. 
71.  DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 8. 
72.  See supra Part III.A. 
73.  See supra Part III.A. 
74.  E.g., DMR 2009, supra note 2, at 5. 
 
